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Reproductive Freedom:
Abortion Rights of Incarcerated
and Non-Incarcerated Women
BY SARAH TANKERSLEY*
INTRODUCrION
S ince 1973, American women have had the legal right to
terminate their pregnancies.' This controversial right has been
modified in many ways since then.2 Incarcerated women have the same
right to terminate their pregnancies as other women. However, the
incarcerated pregnant woman is not constrained by the practical obstacles
faced by her counterparts outside of prison.4 The surprising result is that
American women in prison have more reproductive freedom than
unincarcerated American women.
This Note will address this disparity. Part I will address the general
right to have an abortion.5 This section will discuss the right to privacy
* J.D. expected 1997, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1993, Northern
Kentucky University.
1 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2 See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (upholding a
requirement that doctors performing abortions inform the patient of all
consequences to her fetus, even though such information has no effect on her
own health and is far more inclusive than the normally applicable informed
consent doctrine, and upholding a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period);
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding law forbidding recipients of
Title X funding from referring a pregnant client to an abortion provider, even
upon specific request). See also the following cases upholding laws prohibiting
any government funding of abortions for indigent women: Websterv. Reproduc-
tive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
3 See infra notes 49-106 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 107-62 and accompanying text.
5 See infra notes 18-48 and accompanying text. This Note will assume
throughout that the pregnancy at issue is not the result of rape, either in prison
or outside.
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under cases from Griswold v. Connecticut6 to Roe v. Wade and limitations
thereon under Roe and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.8 Part II will address
the legal bases for providing abortions to inmates.9 These bases include a
prisoner's right to be free from deliberate indifference to her serious medical
needs under Estelle v. Gamble,"0 as well as the impropriety of denying
prisoners their rights unless such denial is reasonably related to a legitimate
penological objective under Turner v. Safley." These bases are synthesized
by the Supreme Court in Monmouth County Correctional Institution Inmates
v. Lanzaro1 2 Part I will address the actual availability of an abortion to
incarcerated and non-incarcerated women." This section considers depen-
dency on the prison system, 4 accessibility of services, 5 and funding by
the government. 6 Part IV will address policy considerations in determining
the extent to which the government will facilitate abortions both inside and
outside of the prison system. 7 Finally, Part V will conclude with an
argument that women outside the prison system should have the same
reproductive freedom as their incarcerated counterparts, including the
accessibility and funding to make their right to choose a meaningful one.
I. GENERAL RIGHT TO AN ABORTION
A. Right to Privacy: From Griswold to Roe
A woman's right to terminate her pregnancy was established in the
landmark decision of Roe v. Wade." Roe came about as the logical next
6 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
' Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See infra notes 27-30 and accompa-
nying text.
S Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See infra notes 31-48
and accompanying text.
9 See infra notes 49-106 and accompanying text.
'o Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). See infra notes 49-78 and
accompanying text.
"Turnerv. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). See infra notes 79-89 and accompa-
nying text.
12 Monmouth County Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). See infra notes 90-106
and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 107-62 and accompanying text.
'4 See infra notes 107-20 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 121-49 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 150-62 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 163-75 and accompanying text.
" Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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step in a series of cases propounding the right to privacy, or "'the right
to be let alone."" 9 These cases, as they affect reproductive freedom,
began in 1965 with Griswold v. Connecticut.2" Griswold invalidated a
law prohibiting the use of contraceptive devices by married couples on
the theory that government should not interfere with the "intimate
relation[s] of husband and wife,"' which are "intimate to the degree of
being sacred." '22
In 1972, Eisenstadt v. Baird" extended the right to use contracep-
tives to unmarried persons.24 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan
observed that the right to privacy is not a marital right, because a
marriage is not an "independent entity with a mind and heart of its own,
but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and
emotional makeup."2 Therefore, the right to use contraceptives is the
right of an individual within a marriage, and Equal Protection prohibits
substantial difference between the rights of married persons and those of
26single persons.
The Court in Roe v. Wade extended the right to privacy and furthered
the availability of contraception, concluding that "the right of person-
al privacy includes the abortion decision." '27 The Court based its
ruling on a line of cases recognizing a right to personal privacy and
bodily integrity,2" and upon the "detriment that the State would impose
'9 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
20 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
21 Id. at 482.
22Id. at 486.
23 Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
24 Id.
25 Id. at 453.
261Id. Equal Protection allows substantial differences in treatment of
persons in similar circumstances only if such differences are reasonably related
to compelling government interests. Id. at 446-47 ("' [T]his Court has consistent-
ly recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power
to treat different classes of persons in different ways.... The Equal Protec-
tion Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to states the power to
legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into
different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of
that statute."' (quoting Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1971))).
27 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973). This right is not unqualified,
however. Id. See infra notes 31-48 and accompanying text.
28 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citing Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
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upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether,"'29 includ-
ing mental, physical, and psychological harm caused by forced materni-
ty.3 0
B. Limitations Thereon: From Roe to Casey
Roe, while upholding a woman's right to have an abortion, never
held that the right was absolute. Indeed, the Court held that "this right
is not unqualified and must be considered against important state
interests in regulation." '3 Presumably acceptable state interests men-
tioned by the Court included "safeguarding health [of the mother], ...
maintaining medical standards, and ... protecting potential life."'32 In
order to balance these interests, the Court devised a trimester para-
digm.
In terms of maternal health and the maintenance of medical standards,
the Court recognized that a first trimester abortion is statistically
safer than continued pregnancy.33 Consequently, a woman can have an
"abortion free of interference by the State"34 until the end of the
third month of a pregnancy, and after that point it is permissible for the
State to "regulate the abortion procedure to the extent that the regula-
tion reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal
health."'35
In terms of the protection of potential life, the Court determined that
the State can have a "compelling" State interest in regulating the
pregnancy.6 The Court decided to fix this superseding interest at the
(contraception); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships); Skinnerv. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (child rearing and education)).
29 Id. at 153.
3 1Id. These same harms are referred to in Monmouth Co. Corr. Inst.
Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 349 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S.
1006 (1988).
31 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
32 T
33 Id. at 163.
34 rd.
36 Id.
222 [Vol. 85
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point of viability.37 Viability, at least at the time of Roe, was approxi-
mately seven months, possibly six months.3" Since the "compelling"
point for maternal health is earlier, at three months, this is the point that
the Court fixed for unfettered termination of a pregnancy by choice.39
In light of modem advances in medical technology, the maternal
health considerations are being pushed forward into later pregnancy,
while the viability aspect is being pushed back into earlier pregnancy, a
fact recognized by Justice O'Connor as early as 1983.40 Consequently,
in 1992, the Court in Planned Parenthood v. Casey "reject[ed] the
trimester framework' t' in favor of an undue burden standard, therefore
invalidating "a state regulation [that had] the purpose or effect of placing
a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus."'2
The Casey Court applied its undue burden standard to several
questions. The Court upheld an informed consent requirement that a
doctor tell a patient seeking an abortion about "the consequences to the
fetus, even when those consequences have no direct relation to her
health";43 upheld a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting period between
the decision to abort the pregnancy and the actual performance of the
procedure;' struck down a spousal notification requirement;45 upheld
a parental consent requirement for minors, with judicial bypass;" and
upheld a record-keeping requirement,47 except that the records cannot
require a woman to explain her refusal to inform her spouse of her
abortion.48
37 Id.
11 Id. at 160.
391 Id. at 163.
40 Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 452
(1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting), overruled by Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
41 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873 (1992).
42 Id. at 877.
41 Id. at 882 (overruling Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) and Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) as far as they are inconsistent).
' Id. at 885-86 (overruling Akron v. Akron Centerfor Reproductive Health,
Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) as far as it is inconsistent).
41 Id. at 892-98.
46 Id. at 899-900.
47 Id. at 900-01.
48 Id. at 901.
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II. LEGAL BASIS FOR PROVIDING ABORTIONS TO INMATES
A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs: The Estelle
Standard
49
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the use of cruel or unusual
punishment on prisoners.5" This guarantee began as a prohibition on
"'torture[s]' and other 'barbar[ous]' methods of punishment,"' and now
includes "punishments which are incompatible with 'the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society," 52
or which "'involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.' 
5 3
The Court in Estelle v. Gamble established that the Eighth Amend-
ment gives incarcerated individuals the right to receive adequate medical
care.54 J.W. Gamble, an inmate in a Texas state prison, sustained a back
injury while in prison and claimed that he received inadequate medical
treatment for his injuries.5" The Supreme Court, refusing to grant relief
41 The consideration of the standard developed in Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97 (1976), in determining that the right to an abortion is a fundamental
right in the form of a serious medical need is less important, now that Casey has
established the right to an abortion as a fundamental right in the form of a right
to privacy. However, Monmouth Co. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326 (3d Cir., 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988) (ensuring prisoner
abortions on demand) was decidedbefore PlannedParenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992), and that Court gives great weight to Estelle. Estelle is worth
discussion for that reason.
" The Eighth Amendment to the Constitution reads as follows: "Excessive
bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
See generally Anthony F. Grannucci, Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Inflicted: The Original Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 839 (1969) (seminal work
covering the historical background of the right to be free from cruel or unusual
punishment).
5' Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (quoting Grannucci, supra note 50, at 839).
52 Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
5 Id. at 103 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality
opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)).
' Id. at 104 ("We therefore conclude that deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain,' Gregg v. Georgia, [428 U.S. 153] at 173 .... proscribed by the Eighth
Amendment.").
5 Id. at 98-101.
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to Gamble,16 set forth a twofold standard to define "inadequate medical
care" in order to determine whether a violation of the Eighth Amendment
occurred.57 To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, an inmate must
demonstrate (1) that he had a "serious medical need" and (2) that prison
officials acted with "deliberate indifference" thereto. 8
The Estelle Court did not define "serious medical need," but did give
some examples, including a severed ear, an allergic reaction to penicillin,
and leg surgery. 9 Pregnancy, including elective abortion, was later
defined as a serious medical need under this standard." Although
pregnancy is a normal part of the life of any woman who chooses to bear
children and is by no means an illness or injury, it is a serious medical
need, and all aspects of medical treatment relating to pregnancy must be
made available to prisoners.6
The second prong of the Estelle test is "deliberate indifference."62
Even when a serious medical need has been identified and not treated, the
Court will not find that an Eighth Amendment violation has occurred
unless prison officials acted with "deliberate indifference."'63 Officials
will not be held liable for a constitutional violation if they acted without
malice and the denial of medical treatment was due to a good faith
mistake.' 4 In explaining that "[a]n accident, although it may produce
added anguish, is not on that basis alone to be characterized as wanton
infliction of unnecessary pain,"" the Court used, as an example, the
case of a condemned prisoner who was sent to the electric chair a second
time, after a mechanical malfunction thwarted the first attempt to execute
him.66 Since the pain inflicted the first time was "accidental," it was not
deemed cruel and unusual to try again.
56 Id. at 107-08.
"' Id. at 106; see Mary Catherine McGurrin, Pregnant Inmates' Right to
Health Care, 20 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 163 nn.15 & 16
(1993) (discussing the requisites for showing an Eighth Amendment violation).
58 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106.
s9 Id. at 104 n.10.
60 Monmouth Co. Corr. Inst. Inmatesv. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,348 (3d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
61 Id.
62 Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
63 Id.
64Id. at 105.
65 Id.
66 Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947), cited in
Estelle, 429 U.S. at 97, 105.
1996-971
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
The Estelle standard has become no less stringent in recent years. In
Wilson v. Seiter,67 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
generally unsatisfactory prison conditions could rise to the level of an
Eight Amendment violation. In holding that they could not, Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, noted that "[n]othing so amorphous as 'overall
conditions' can rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment when
no specific deprivation of a single human need exists. 68
Further, in Farmer v. Brennan,69 the Court held that there can be no
Eighth Amendment violation "unless the official knows of and disregards
an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be
aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial
risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference." '7
Farmer was a transsexual, a biological man persistently uncomfortable
with his gender who "wore women's clothing, . . . underwent estrogen
therapy, received silicone breast implants, and submitted to unsuccess-
ful 'black market' testicle-removal surgery."'" While incarcerated within
the general male prison population for credit card fraud, s/he was beaten
and raped by another inmate. The Court held that a prison official could
show that he "knew the underlying facts but believed (albeit unsoundly)
that the risk to which the facts gave rise was insubstantial or nonexis-
tent.
72
These two cases (Wilson and Farmer) are illustrative of the Supreme
Court's reluctance to consider the discomfort of prisoners to be an Eighth
Amendment violation unless there is a clear showing of malice on the
part of prison officials. In his dissent to Hudson v. McMillian, Justice
Thomas went so far as to say that the beating of a handcuffed and
shackled inmate by two prison guards is not an Eighth Amendment
violation if the harm caused is not "significant."'73 While only Thomas
67 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991). The conditions complained of
were "overcrowding, excessive noise, insufficient locker storage space,
inadequate heating and cooling, improper ventilation, unclean and inadequate
restrooms, unsanitary dining facilities and food preparation, and housing with
mentally and physically ill inmates." Id. at 296.
68 Id. at 305.
69 Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
70 Id. at 1979.
71 Id. at 1975.
72 Id. at 1982.
7' Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 17 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Hudson "suffered minor bruises and swelling of his face, mouth, and lip," as well
as loose teeth and a cracked dental plate, in the incident. Id. at 4.
[Vol. 85
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d Scalia dissented74 from the majority holding in Hudson that the
mate's rights had been violated, the fact that two Justices on the
ipreme Court feel that a chained inmate beaten by prison officials has
at been subjected to cruel and unusual punishment shows how stringent
ie Eighth Amendment standard can be.
Far less extreme is that "an inadvertent failure to provide adequate
nedical care"!5 is also an accident, not giving rise to an Eighth Amend-
ment claim. 'edical malpractice does not become a constitutional
violation merely because the victim is a prisoner."" Failure to assist a
prisoner in obtaining an abortion due to administrative confusion and
inadvertent delay has been held to fall within that realm of medical
mistakes which do not constitute deliberate indifference," although
pregnancy is a serious medical need under Estelle.7"
B. Reasonable Relation to Legitimate Penological Objectives:
The Turner Standard
Having determined that deliberate indifference to a serious medical
need relating to pregnancy, including the need to have an elective
abortion within the legal and medical time frame of early pregnancy,
violates a constitutionally guaranteed right,79 it is necessary to examine
when it is permissible to limit this constitutional right. Prisoners, by
definition, lack many of the freedoms that other people take for granted,
and because of this, many of the rights associated with freedom are
"significantly curtailed."80
A balancing test to determine the extent to which a prisoner's rights
may be "significantly curtailed" is set forth in Turner v. Safley.1 Turner
involved a prison regulation denying prisoners the right to get married.
The regulation was struck down and the following rule of law was
established: "when a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional
rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate
74 1d. at 17.
7. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105.
76 Id. at 106.
77 Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1991). See infra notes 107-20
and accompanying text for further discussion of deliberate indifference.
78 Monmouth Co. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,348 (3d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
79 Id.
10 Gibson, 926 F.2d at 535-36.
8' Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
)6-97]
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penological interests." 2 The Court developed a multifaceted schemi
determining whether a regulation is reasonably related to a N
penological interest: (1) whether there is a "valid, rational con
tion" between the regulation and the legitimate government interes
be served; 3 (2) whether there are alternative means for the priso
to exercise the right in question;84 (3) whether accommodating
right will have serious detrimental effect on guards, other inmat
and allocation of prison resources in general;"5 and (4) whether tht
are alternative means for the prison to accommodate the prisoner
rights.
86
Using these criteria, the Turner Court upheld a ban on inter-priso
correspondence, which served the valid penological interest of lessenin
the possibility of organized criminal or prison gang activities,87 an(
struck down a ban on prison marriages as serving no valid penologica,
interest.88 It has since been held that, under the Turner guidelines, denial
or delay of an elective abortion is not reasonably related to any legitimate
penological interest.8
C. A Synthesis of the Two: The Monmouth Decision
In 1987, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in Monmouth
County Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro,9" held that inmates
cannot be impeded from obtaining abortions. The extent of the holding
includes the requirement that the county ensure the availability of
funding.91 At issue in Monmouth was a regulation requiring inmates to
obtain a court-ordered release on their own recognizance for the purpose
82 Id. at 89.
" Id. (citations omitted).
84 Id. at 90.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 90-91.
87 Id. at 91-92.
88 Id. at 97-98.
89 Monmouth Co. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326,338 (3d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). A penological interest is related to the
ease of administration of the prison system. It is not a legitimate penological
interest to enforce morality.
90 Id.
91 Id.; see Susan Stefan, Whose Egg Is it Anyway? Reproductive Rights of
Incarcerated, Institutionalized and Incompetent Women, 13 NOVA L. REV. 405
(1989). See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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of obtaining an abortion, and to provide their own funding.92 The
Monmouth court drew its decision from Estelle and Turner.
Under the Estelle standard,93 the Monmouth court found that the
requirement of a court order for elective abortion constituted deliberate
indifference to a serious medical need.94 That an elective abortion is a
serious medical need is predicated on three factors. First, pregnancy is a
medical condition, although it is not an abnormal medical condition
requiring remedial care.95 Second, the denial of an elective abortion has
necessarily significant effects on a woman's mental, physical, and
emotional health based on the rigors of a full-term pregnancy, childbirth,
and care of an unwanted child.96 Third, an elective abortion is time-
bound, so that denial or delay renders the inmate's condition "irrepara-
ble."97 The court order requirement constitutes deliberate indifference
because it is time-consuming for a minimum-security inmate to obtain a
court-ordered release on her own recognizance, leading to a later and
thereby less safe abortion, or possibly delaying the abortion until it is
legally or medically impossible.98 A maximum security inmate will be
unable to get a court-ordered release at all, and so would be forced to
carry the pregnancy to term. 99
The Monmouth court also struck down the regulation based on the
Turner standard of reasonable relation to a legitimate penological interest.
First, there is no logical connection between the court order requirement
and any penological interest, as any security or other risk involved in
obtaining an abortion is the same as the risks involved in obtaining any
other medical procedure."'0 Second, there are no alternative means
available to the inmate to obtain an abortion, especially for a maximum
security inmate who will be unable to obtain a court-ordered release. 0'
92 Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 328.
93 See supra notes 49-78 and accompanying text.
94 Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 348.
95 Id.
96 Id. These are the same concerns originally mentioned in Roe v. Wade. See
supra note 30 and accompanying text.
9' Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 348.
98 Id. at 337.
99 Id. This could create a sort of "baby farm," where inmate mothers,
carrying unwanted children and denied abortions, provide a supply of newborns
for couples looking to adopt. The issues surrounding this scenario are beyond the
scope of this Note.
OId. at 338.
10' Id. at 339.
1996-97]
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Even for minimum security inmates, the delay necessitated by obtaining
a court order may effectively deny an inmate's abortion by pushing her
over the threshold of legal or medical feasibility.'0 2 Third, accommodat-
ing inmates' rights to abortion services will not have any serious
detrimental impact on prison resources, as providing an abortion
"impose[s] no more, and indeed probably less, administrative and
financial burdens on [prison] officials" than providing requisite prenatal
care if the inmate chooses not to terminate her pregnancy. 3 Finally,
there are viable alternatives to accommodate the prisoners' rights; namely
treating elective abortions like any other medical process and providing
that service on the same terms as other medical services.' Such
treatment would be a de minimis cost because the system for handling
medical care is already in place.' 5
Thus, the Monmouth court combined Estelle and Turner to hold that
the right to an elective abortion is a constitutional right that may not be
impinged upon by prison regulations." 6
III. AcruAL AVAmABILrrY OF ABORTION
TO INCARCERATED AND NON-INCARCERATED WOMEN
A. Dependency on the Prison System: The Gibson Decision
The biggest problem encountered by inmates seeking an abortion is
that they are necessarily dependent upon prison authorities to provide this
service, as well as all other services, for them. 7 A pregnant woman in
prison must ask her jailers to arrange for her to get an abortion. If they
refuse to accommodate her, she cannot just go to the next clinic on her
list. While it may be possible for her to get an abortion without the
cooperation of her jailers,"0 8 it becomes very difficult. Refused assis-
12 Id .
103 Id. at 342. A few prisons, most notably the Bedford Hills Correctional
Facility in New York, allow children of inmates to live in the prison for a certain
length of time. In these cases, the prison must absorb postnatal and child care
costs as well as prenatal costs. A discussion of such facilities and their
implications is beyond the scope of this Note.
14 Id. at 344.
105 Id.
106 McGurrin, supra note 57, at 163.
107 Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 345.
108 For example, she can contact a private attorney, assuming that she can
afford one or can get one to take her case pro bono, and get a writ of prohibition
[Vol. 85
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tance, she may very well have to bear the child and all the responsibilities
of parenthood. This includes the unique responsibility of a parent in
prison: that of placing her child in the care of another until she is
released from prison. "The Warden may not permit the inmate's new
born child to return to the institution.... Child placement is the inmate's
responsibility."'' 9
Gibson v. Matthews"' illustrates an inmate's total dependency on
the prison system to provide abortion services as requested. The Sixth
Circuit held that prison officials' refusal to assist Leisa Gibson, who was
then pregnant and serving time for bank robbery, to terminate her
pregnancy did not constitute the "deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need" required to state an Eighth Amendment claim."'
The court predicated the Gibson decision on two considerations. First,
the failure to perform the abortion could not be blamed on any one
defendant, based on that defendant's actions in the situation he faced, and
no liability could therefore attach to any defendant."' Second, the
officials were protected under qualified immunity, which provides that an
or a temporary restraining order to force the prison to accommodate her need for
an abortion. See Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1983 (1994) (inmate may
seek injunction based on claim that officials are knowingly and unreasonably
disregarding objectively intolerable risk of harm and will continue to do so).
109 28 C.F.R. § 551.24 (1996). A few prisons in New York allow inmates'
babies to live in the prison nursery for a period of time, but these are by far the
minority. See supra note 103.
110 Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532 (6th Cir. 1991).
"' Id. While awaiting sentencing, Gibson wrote to the federal public
defender and to the district court judge who would sentence her in April, 1986,
indicating that she was then about 13-14 weeks pregnant and specifically stating
that she desired to terminate her pregnancy. She was sentenced in May and
travelled through various facilities, arriving at the Federal Correctional Institution
in Lexington, Kentucky, in June. At that point, she was informed by the prison
doctor that her pregnancy was too far advanced to have an abortion. There is no
specific indication that any one person refused outright to procure an abortion for
her (which is why the court held that there was no violation of her Constitutional
rights), but the fact remains that she wanted an abortion and could not get one
due to the failure of any prison official to act on her behalf. An abortion should
have been arranged at her first request, especially considering that she was
already into the second trimester of pregnancy at that point. Id. at 533.
112 Id. at 534-35. Gibson did not attempt to sue the medical director of any
individual prison, or of the Bureau of Prisons as a whole. The Court does not
address whether the buck would have stopped there in its "passing the buck"
analysis. Id.
1996-97]
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official will not be held liable for an act or omission "unless any
reasonable government official would know or reasonably should have
known that the action would violate a clearly established constitutional
right." ''1 Qualified immunity was held to exist in Gibson because at the
time of the events in question there was no clearly established constitu-
tional right that prison employees facilitate abortions.' 4
However, the situation has changed since Gibson. The events in
Gibson took place in 1986; Monmouth was not decided until 1987.
Although Gibson was decided in 1991, the ruling was based on the state
of the law in 1986. The Gibson court gave due consideration to the
Monmouth decision as regards the issue of qualified immunity,"'
pointing out that the Gibson case had to be decided based on the facts
and circumstances as they were in 1986, not as they were in 1987, after
Monmouth.1 6 Judge Boggs, writing for the Court, asserted, "[w]e do
not believe that it was a clearly established constitutional right at the time
of the alleged actions regarding Gibson that federal prison employees
were required to facilitate prisoners in their requests for an abortion,'. 7
and, "[a]t the time these events tookplace, there were no reported cases
regarding the abortion rights of prisoners." ''1 It seems clear that, had
Monmouth been decided before the Gibson events took place, the actions
of the prison officials, taken as a whole, would have violated a clearly
established constitutional right.
Although the court specifically said that it would have ruled against
Gibson even after Monmouth removed the qualified immunity ques-
tion," 9 on the grounds that no single defendant acted with "deliberate
indifference" to Gibson's medical needs, and that each acted in accor-
dance with his honest medical judgment,'20 Monmouth's removal of the
qualified immunity defense goes far toward insuring that an inmate who
desires an abortion will get one. Gibson was transferred through several
prisons during her pregnancy and never stayed in one place long enough
to make any single individual responsible for failure to assist her in
obtaining an abortion. From Monmouth and the qualified immunity
11 Id. at 535 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982);
Dominque v. Telb, 831 F.2d 673, 676 (6th Cir. 1987)).
11
4 Id.
"1 Id. at 535-36.
116 Id. at 535.
117 Id. (emphasis added).
11 Id. (emphasis added).
119 Id. at 536.
120 Id.
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holding in Gibson, it appears that an inmate who, in interactions with the
same prison and the same set of prison officials, requests an abortion and
does not get one will have a cause of action against those prison
officials.
It is true that a prison could still shuffle a pregnant inmate around
long enough to deliberately prevent her from obtaining an abortion, but
there is no reasonable explanation as to why a prison would do that.
From an administrative perspective, it is surely easier to schedule an
abortion than to be prepared for imminent childbirth, which cannot be
planned for a convenient time. Also, from a liability perspective, Gibson
does not alter liability predicated on deliberate indifference. It would be
a huge risk to try to conceal such deliberate indifference, and it would
serve no purpose. It, therefore, appears that an inmate who wants an
abortion will get one, barring a good faith mistake on the part of prison
officials.
B. Accessibility
The ability of incarcerated women to obtain abortion services should
be contrasted with that of pregnant women who are not imprisoned. They
too have the basic right from Roe v. Wade"' to terminate their preg-
nancies. However, Roe guarantees only that they will be free from
intervention,' and the Court has since consistently upheld laws that
can be seen only as practical obstacles to actually exercising the right to
have an abortion."
To begin with, there is the question of abortion counseling. A woman
who cannot afford to go to a private doctor and must seek medical care
under Title X might not be informed that an abortion is one option for
121 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
122id. at 163-64.
" In upholding these laws, the Court has consistently held that constitutional
protection of a right does not entail a constitutional guarantee of the ability or
resources to fully exercisethat right. Planned Parenthoodv. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
874 (1992) (upholding a requirement that doctors performing abortions inform
the patient of all consequences to her fetus, even though such information has no
effect on her own health and is far more inclusive than the normally applicable
informed consent doctrine, and upholding a mandatory twenty-four hour waiting
period). See supra note 2 and accompanying text. Intervention as prohibited by
Roe appears to involve an affirmative act on the part of the government to hinder
a woman seeking an abortion, but does not apply to the regulation of abortion
services which may more passively hinder her.
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her. 24 If she does not realize on her own that this is a viable medical
alternative and that she has a legal right to pursue it, her rights under Roe
might just as well not exist. Even if she does know that she can have an
abortion and asks how to obtain one, no facility subsidized by the federal
government can give her any advice, counseling, or referrals on the
subject.
25
Although the absolute "gag rule" prohibition on providing any
reference to abortion providers was suspended in f 993,126 it is still true
that "[a] title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use
of abortion as a method of family planning.', 127 When Title X projects
do refer a pregnant woman to another health care provider,128 they are
required to tell the patient that they do not refer for abortions and to
provide her with "a list of available providers that promote the welfare
of mother and unborn child."'2 9 This list may include health care
providers who perform no abortions 3' and providers who perform some
abortions and some prenatal care, but no providers "whose principal
business is the provision of abortions.''
The prohibition on referring a woman specifically to abortion
providers hinders her in two ways. First, by telling her that it does not
refer for abortions, a Title X project may convey the idea that abortion
is not only less socially desirable than pregnancy (a message Title X
admittedly intends to convey) but also less legally or medically appropri-
ate than pregnancy. Since women who seek help through Title X are
124 "A title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of
abortion as a method of family planning or provide a referral for abortion as a
method of family planning." 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(a)(1) (1995).
Title X is a federal program which provides contraceptive and general
reproductive health services to low-income women. Title X care extends only to
preconceptionservices. Title X providers, upon finding that a woman is pregnant,
cannot treat her throughout pregnancy, but may refer her to a provider that
promotes "the welfare of mother and unborn child." Id. § 59.8(a)(2).
125 id.
126 Id. § 59.8 (the enforcement of this prohibition on counseling and referral
for abortion services was suspended effective Feb. 5, 1993).
127 Id. § 59.8(a)(1).
128 Title X performs only family planning, i.e. pre-conceptionservices. These
include "preconceptional counseling, education, and general reproductive health
care," but not pregnancy care or abortion services. Id. § 59.2.
129 Id. § 59.8(a)(2).
130 Id. § 59.8(b).
'3' Id. § 59.8(a)(3).
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likely to be among the younger and poorer women in America,132 it is
likely that they may be unsure of their legal rights and/or their medical
alternatives. The statement by a Title X employee that abortion is legally
or medically undesirable may be enough to convince her to carry the
pregnancy to term, even though she does not want a child, based solely
on the misinformed conclusions she draws from the Title X facility's
unwillingness to refer.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court in Rust v. Sulli-
van,133 addressed this concern by saying that, as Title X projects
address only preconception issues, "a doctor's silence with regard to
abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client....""'
However, when a Title X provider informs a woman that she is pregnant
and tells her that "the project does not consider abortion an appropriate
method of family planning and therefore does not counsel or refer for
abortion... [but] that the project can help her to obtain prenatal care and
necessary social services," '135 it is very misleading. A reasonable
woman, upon hearing this explanation, could easily believe that abortion
is less legally or medically desirable than pregnancy. This is especially
true of the young and poor women who are the most likely to seek
governmental assistance in meeting their medical needs. 36 While it is
true that most American women today, regardless of their socio-economic
status, understand that they have the right to terminate an unwanted
pregnancy, the fact that an unfair rule will affect only a few makes it no
less unfair. 37
Secondly, refusal to refer a woman to abortion providers denies her
the knowledge of those best equipped to help her in procuring an
abortion. Logically, doctors and clinics who "specialize" in abortions will
have the most experience in abortion services and will, therefore, be the
best providers available. A woman seeking assistancethrough Title X will
not be referred, even indirectly, to these facilities. Thus, a woman who
requests a referral to get an abortion will receive only a list of providers
132 PlannedParenthoodFederationof America, Fact Sheet: America 'sFamily
Planning Program: Title X at 2 (visited July 19, 1996), <http://www.ppfa.org/
ppfa/titlex.html>.
3 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
'
34 _d. at 200.
13- 42 C.F.R. § 59.8(b)(5) (1995).
136 Most of the over four million women who seek Title X care are young
and poor. Fact Sheet, supra note 132, at 2.
137 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992).
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of both abortion and prenatal services, rather than the more helpful list
of experts in abortion services.
Prison inmates, however, are counseled as to the availability of
abortions. Not only are prison staff allowed to counsel a pregnant inmate
about.the abortion option, they are required to do so.'38 "The Warden
shall offer to provide each pregnant inmate with medical, religious, and
social counseling to aid her in making the decision whether to carry the
pregnancy to full term or to have an elective abortion."'39 Thus, an
inmate receives a full range of counseling about her alternatives, while
an unincarcerated woman receives counseling geared toward only one of
her two alternatives: that of carrying her pregnancy to term.
Further, there is the question of availability and arrangements for an
abortion. States do not have to provide facilities to perform abortions 40
and a woman desiring to terminate her pregnancy may have to travel to
a distant city in order to find a clinic that does perform abortions. Once
she has arrived and spoken with a doctor, the state can require her to wait
twenty-four hours before actually obtaining the abortion.14 1 She is
completely without assistance in terms of finding a doctor, arranging
transportation and finding a place to stay for the twenty-four hours she
must wait.
An inmate, however, need only inform her unit manager in writing
that she desires an abortion and all the arrangements will be made for
her.4 1 The court in Gibson explained that regulations in 1986, at the
time of Gibson's pregnancy, placed the burden of arranging for an
abortion on the inmate. 43 As the court stated, "[t]he inmate is required
to give the staff direction 'to arrange for the abortion to take place at a
hospital or clinic outside the institution."' The regulation in question,
28 C.F.R. § 551.23(c), has since been changed to place all the burdens
'31 28 C.F.R. § 551.23(b) (1996).
1
3 9 
Id.
140 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
141 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (overruling Akron v.
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983) as far as it is
inconsistent). See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
142 "Upon receipt of the inmate's written statements required by paragraph
(b) of this section, ordinarily submitted through the unit manager, the Clinical
Director shall arrange for an abortion to take place." 28 C.F.R. § 551.23(c)
(1996).
143 Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 538 (6th Cir. 1991).
44 Id. (quoting 28 C.F.R § 551.23(d) (1986)).
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of arrangements on the facility, without requiring direction thereof by the
inmate. Subsection (d) has disappeared entirely, and subsection (c) now
reads as follows: "Upon receipt of the inmate's written statements
required by paragraph (b) of this section, ordinarily submitted through the
unit manager, the Clinical Director shall arrange for an abortion to take
place." 4' It is clear that the regulation as it stands now is "couched in
such mandatory terms"'46 as to create a "legitimate claim of entitle-
ment"'47 for an inmate to have an abortion arranged. Compare this to
the Title X requirement "prohibit[ing] actions to assist women to obtain
abortions."'48 Again, it is easier for an inmate to have an abortion than
for her counterpart who has committed no crime.
149
C. Funding
Finally, there is the question of funding for abortions. The govern-
ment is not obligated to fund abortions for women who cannot afford
them. '5 It is clear that federal funds may not be used "to pay for
abortions except when continuation of the pregnancy would endanger the
mother's life."'' Furthermore, it has been established by case law that
state governments may not be required to fund abortions." 2
In Maher v. Roe,'53 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, stated that
a state could make "a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion
and.., implement that judgment by the allocation of public funds." 154
14s 28 C.F.R. § 551.23(c) (1996).
146 Gibson, 926 F.2d at 538.
47 Id. (quoting Washingtonv. Starke, 855 F.2d 346, 349 (6th Cir. 1988) and
Bills v. Henderson, 631 F.2d 1287, 1292 (6th Cir. 1980)).
148 42 C.F.R. § 59.10(a) (1995).
149 In no other situation does the government assist in abortion arrangements.
In fact, women serving in the military, another situation where their lives are
dictatedby the needs of the system, cannot get an abortion in a military hospital.
This applies even overseas, where other abortion services may not be available,
and without consideration of funding. For 1997, the Senate has voted to repeal
the ban and the House has voted to retain it. Helen Dewar, Senate Votes to Lift
Military Abortion Ban, WASH. POST, June 20, 1996, at A23.
0 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
"' 42 C.F.R. § 441.200 (1995).
152 See infra notes 153-59.
13 Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
154 id. at 474.
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Later, in Harris v. McRae,'55 which upheld the Hyde Amendment, 15 6
Justice Stewart for the Court wrote that "it simply does not follow that
a woman's freedom of choice carries with it a constitutional entitlement
to the financial resources to avail herself of the full range of protected
choices."' 57 In Webster v. Reproductive Health Services,158 the Court
asserted that "the State need not commit any resources to facilitating
abortions, even if it can turn a profit by doing so. ' 159 Thus, it is clear
from case law that a woman who cannot fund her own elective abortion
is effectively denied the right to have one.
In fact, the refusal to fund abortions for indigent women is one of the
bases for the Gibson court's decision that there was no clearly established
constitutional right in 1986 to the procurement of an abortion for an
inmate. 6 ' The Monmouth decision changed that presumption and
declared that an inmate does have a right to a funded abortion if she is
unable to afford one.' 61 "[The prison] may not condition the provision
of services for an elective, nontherapeutic abortion upon.., the inmates'
ability or willingness to pay. Moreover, in the absence of alternative
methods of funding, the County must assume the cost of providing
inmates with elective, nontherapeutic abortions.', 162 Thus, a poor woman
who desires an elective abortion is better off in prison than she is on her
own.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
From the foregoing discussion, it is apparent that the government has
decided to assist inmates in procuring non-therapeutic abortions, while
refusing to assist their non-incarcerated counterparts. The policy reasons
for assisting inmates are clear. Administratively, it is easier to deal with
a prison population that is uncomplicated by pregnancies. A woman who
is pregnant has more needs than a woman who is not pregnant, including
's Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
156 Hyde Amendment, Pub. L. 94-439, Title II, § 209, 90 Stat. 1434 (1976)
(the Hyde Amendment authorizes funding for childbirth-related expenses, but not
for abortion-related expenses).
157 Harris, 448 U.S. at 316.
158 Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
151 Id. at 492.
160 Gibson v. Matthews, 926 F.2d 532, 536 (6th Cir. 1991).
161 Monmouth Co. Corr. Inst. Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326 (3d Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988).
162Id. at 351.
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better nutrition to support her growing fetus, clothing to fit her changing
body, and prenatal care to monitor her pregnancy. Additionally, the time
and manner of childbirth cannot be predicted, so toward the end of her
pregnancy she will need to be observed closely to ensure that she can
receive the requisite medical assistance in the delivery of her baby.163
Prison officials would probably prefer to have no pregnant women in
their charge.
Further, policies supporting intact families and encouraging women
to bear and to raise children are less applicable in prison than in the
general population. With the exception of a few prisons in New York that
have nursery programs and encourage incarcerated women to be active
in the care of their very young children,1" the United States criminal
justice system is not designed to allow mothers and babies to remain
together. When a newborn has to be shuffled immediately to relatives or
to foster care, the illusion of an intact family is shattered.
Finally, there may be an unspoken policy to encourage inmates to
have abortions. Such a policy would be based on the perception of
prisoners as socially undesirable. Law-abiding society would be reluctant
to see such undesirables reproduce.
The policy reasons for not assisting pregnant women outside of prison
in procuring abortions are harder to understand. Fiscally, it does not make
much sense to deny abortion counselling or funding. A woman who seeks
governmental assistance in early pregnancy is not likely, eight or nine
months later, to be able to support a child financially. Further, it is
clearly more difficult for a woman with a child to improve her financial
situation than for a woman without a child, as she will have the added
expenses of caring for the child, including the costs of food, clothing, and
child care. She also may be limited in the kind of employment she can
accept due to her parental responsibilities. For example, she cannot take
a job that requires extensive travel, nor one that requires her to work
during hours that child care is not available. This means that the
163 Additionally, any prison which allows babies to remain with the inmate
mother must arrange for the needs of these babies to be met as well. Currently,
only three prisons in the country allow women inmates to live with their babies.
These are Bedford Hills, Taconic Prison, and Riker's Island, all in New York.
Donna K. Metzler, Neglected by the System: Children of Incarcerated Mothers,
82 ILL. B.J. 428,430 (Aug. 1994). A discussion of prison nurseries is beyond the
scope of this Note.
"6 The best known of these facilities is Bedford Hills, which allows babies
to stay with their mothers until their first birthday. Id.
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government will end up paying for prenatal care through Medicaid...
and possibly for support of the child throughout its minority through
programs such as Aid to Families with Dependent Children,'66 instead
of for the significantly cheaper elective abortion.
Another policy consideration cited in cases such as Monmouth County
Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro'67 is that prisons must
provide abortions because the inmates have no other way to obtain the
service, due to their lack of freedom to move about in the rest of the
world and make the arrangements themselves.'68 This is certainly true.
Prison inmates are severely hampered in their ability to arrange and fund
their own health care. However, women seeking governmental assistance
are also likely to be severely limited in their ability to arrange and fund
their own health care. If they had the funds or connections to obtain an
abortion or other health services from a private doctor,'69 they would
not be visiting a Title X clinic in the first place. 7' So, while prisoners
are dependent upon the government in that they cannot leave prison, poor
women are no less dependent upon the government in that they have
nowhere else to turn for medical treatment and advice.
The Monmouth case'7 ' makes another argument for providing
abortions and funding, therefore, in the prison context but not in the free
world. This argument hinges upon the court's observation that, "[w]hat-
165 Needy pregnant women are provided with "services that are necessary for
the health of the pregnant women and fetus, or that have become necessary as
a result of the woman having been pregnant. These include, but are not limited
to, prenatal care, delivery, postpartum care, and family planning services." 42
C.F.R. § 440.210(2)(i) (1995).
16642 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1995) provides for financial assistance to parents
of needy dependent children to further goals of continuing parental care and
protection.
167 Monmouth County Correctional Institution Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d
326 (3d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1006 (1988). See supra notes 90-106
and accompanying text.
168 Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 345. The issue raised of forced incubation is
beyond the scope of this Note. See supra note 99.
169 A first trimester abortion with a local anesthetic costs $325.00, according
to phone interviews with Women for Women and Women's Medical Center, two
Cincinnati women's clinics. Three hundred twenty-five dollars is more than one
half of a month's rent. It represents a huge burden for a poor woman.
170 It is estimated that Title X clinics are the only source of family planning
services for 83% of the women they serve. Fact Sheet, supra note 132, at 2.
' Monmouth, 834 F.2d at 326.
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ever the government's constitutional obligations to the free world, those
obligations often differ radically in the prison context.' 1 72 For example,
the court notes that many amenities, such as religious materials, food, and
housing, not normally supplied outside of prison are routinely furnished
to inmates and are expected of the prison system. 73 While this is true,
it does not necessarily follow that abortions are among the amenities that
should be provided to inmates, but to no one else. Outside of prison,
there are other avenues to obtain the necessities of life that are supplied
in prison. Religious materials may be provided by the relevant church or
synagogue, and indeed, provision of those materials to the devout may be
seen as one of the primary functions of the institution, to assist members
of the flock in their search for sanctity. Similarly, food, shelter, and
clothing have traditionally been available for the needy through a variety
of church and civic groups such as the Salvation Army and Goodwill, as
well as through various government programs such as Aid to Families
with Dependent Children.'
However, abortions are in an entirely different class than these other
necessities. Abortions are within the realm of medical care, and medical
care for the indigent citizens of this country has traditionally been
provided by the government. Religious and civic groups have neither the
expertise nor the equipment, generally, to provide abortion or any other
pregnancy-related services, and doctors have not traditionally opened their
regular offices to the poor in the way that lawyers do pro bono work for
indigent clients.
Furthermore, the government has already stepped in and agreed to
provide other medical services relating to pregnancy, to the sole exclusion
of abortion services. 7 In no other instance has the government agreed
to provide, for example, religious materials for Jewish persons but not for
Muslims, or to provide dairy products to hungry people, but no meat or
vegetables. Once the government has begun providing a certain type of
service, it should provide all subdivisions of that service on an equal
level. In this instance, once it has decided to provide services relating to
pregnancy, it should provide abortive as well as prenatal services.
172 Id. at 341.
173 Id.
174 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1995).
... Medicaid covers pregnancy-related services including prenatal care,
delivery, postpartum care, family planning services, and services for other
illnesses or medical conditions that might complicate the pregnancy or threaten
the safe delivery of a full-term fetus. 42 C.F.R. § 440.210(a)(2) (1995).
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CONCLUSION
Our society has elected to punish criminals by curtailing their
freedom. However, when female criminals are being punished with the
loss of their physical freedom, they actually have increased reproductive
freedom in terms of the guarantee that they will be able to exercise their
right to terminate an unwanted pregnancy This disparity is unfair to
impoverished women who have committed no crime and who will be
demed an elective abortion. The logical conclusion is that the government
should make abortions available to all women, not just those m prison.
